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RACIAL CARTELS
Daria Roithmayr*
This Article argues that we can better understand the dynamic of historical racial
exclusion if we describe it as the anti-competitive work of "racial cartels." We can
define racial cartels to include a range of all-White groups-homeowners'
associations, school districts, trade unions, real estate boards and political partieswho gained signficant social, economic and political profit from excluding on the
basis of race. Farfrom operating on the basis of irrational animus, racial cartels
actually derived significant profit from racial exclusion. By creating racially
segmented housing markets,for example, exclusive White homeowners' associations
enjoyed higher property values that depended not just on the superiorquality of the
housing stock but also on the racial composition of the neighborhood.
Describinig historical exclusion as anti-competitive cartel conduct highlights three
aspects of discrimination that other descriptions obscure. First, compared to
conventional theory, a racial cartel story emphasizes the material benefits--higher
wages, higher property values, greater political power-that Whites derived from
anti-competitive exclusion. Second, compared to individualist accounts, the cartel
framework emphasizes the collective-action nature of historical discrimination.
Third, calling historical exclusion cartel conduct can help to reframe antidiscrimination law as a type of antitrust legal intervention, designed to remedy
persistent effects of past anti-competitive exclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
On a cold winter morning in Memphis in January 1919, a committee of four White switchmen marched into the office of one Edward
Bodamer, superintendent of the Yazoo and Mississippi Valley railroad. The
switchmen were there, they said, to discuss a demand by the area yard
workers to get rid of the railroad's Black switchmen and yard workers.
Fire all Black workers, they insisted, or the yard would stage a strike. Bodamer refused outright and warned the switchmen that any strike would
be illegal. Soon after, dozens of switchmen and yard workers voted to
walk off the job.'
Over the next five days, the strike spread like wildfire to surrounding railroads and yards, crippling the region's transportation network. At
its peak, the strike united over 650 switchmen in racial solidarity, shutting
down operations in the countless small towns that lined the railroad in
Tennessee, Mississippi and Illinois. At the end of the fifth day, the switchmen called a halt to the walkout, but only after the railroad had promised
investigation by government mediators.
A year later, the White switchmen were back in Bodamer's office.
This time, the committee warned, they had extra firepower-the backing
of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, one of the "Big Four" railroad
brotherhoods. Unable to risk another damaging strike, Bodamer and the
railroad fired almost all of the company's Black workers. For good measure, the railroad adopted racially restrictive contracts that changed
seniority systems and entrance requirements, and limited the number of
Black workers for particular positions.
What was behind this strike? Why had White workers so suddenly
demanded that the railroad evict its Black workers? After all, Black workers had long been around the railroad, working as trainmen and
switchmen since the 1870s. Although White switchmen had occasionally
complained in the past, they had not taken much action against either the
railroads or Black workers.What had changed?
In a word, the economy. Historian Eric Arnesen argues that postwar economic uncertainty over jobs ignited the Memphis strike and
fueled other hate strikes like it. As the economy disintegrated after the
war, workers faced a labor market in such disarray that labor officials
could barely track the job market from week to week.3
1.
The story of the Memphis hate strike is well-chronicled in Erik Arnesen's account of racial exclusion on the railroad. See ERIK ARNESEN, BROTHERHOODS OF COLOR:
BLACK RAILROAD WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 65-69 (2001).
2.

The success of the hate strike in Memphis signaled a major shift for the railroad

industry. After this strike, White unions across the nation began to regularly demand racially restrictive contractual clauses, and most railroad union contracts began to carry

them. See id. at 68.
3.
See id. at 69.
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In addition, the wartime economy had cost White workers their positions of privilege. Out of necessity, the railroad had abandoned its
conventional practice of awarding jobs on the basis of race. To accommodate wartime labor shortages, railroads had found it necessary to be more
flexible in terms of worker allocation. Some Black workers had taken up
White positions, and some Whites were slotted for historically Black positions when the occasion demanded it.4
As soldiers came home from the war, however, railroads were forced
to choose whether to revert back to their old race-conscious ways. Some
railroads switched quickly. Others resisted, and abandoned tracking race
and status altogether, a move that would cost them dearly.'
Following standard economic theory, we could easily describe the
Memphis wildcat strike and the workers' preference for racial exclusion as
a source of competitive disadvantage. Under the standard story, because
discriminating is more expensive than inclusion, forces of market competition will eventually drive out discriminating firms. 6 Railroads that
indulged White workers' desire to exclude would have paid a steep price
to do so. After all, Whites were earning higher wages at the time. Paying
Black workers, who actually were willing to work for lower wages owing
to their historic discrimination, would have been much cheaper for the
railroads, especially big operations like the Yazoo and Mississippi Valley.
White workers were significantly more expensive, particularly if they were
able to bargain for even higher wages using union power.
Unions also would have found discrimination expensive. White
workers were giving up a useful ally in their labor struggles against employers. Black workers could have supplied (and did eventually supply) an
important addition to the ranks of union members. Because racism cost
unions and railroads dearly in terms of competitive advantage, a survivalof-the-fittest competition would have driven out discrimination in favor
of inclusion. Or so the standard story goes.'
But we could tell another story about the hate strike, the sort of story that economic historians and labor scholars might tell.8 In this story,
White unions acted as a market cartel to gain a competitive advantage. By
segmenting the market, White railroad workers could command higher

See id. at 68.
See id. at 68-69.
See discussion infra Part I.
See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
See, e.g., ROBERT HIGGS, COMPETITION AND COERCION: BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 1865-1914 (1977) (discrimination during Jim Crow most often took the
form of stratification between skilled and unskilled); Herbert Hill, The Problem of Race in
American Labor History, 24 REV. AM. HIST. 189 (1996) (unions excluded on the basis of
race for higher wages).
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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wages for themselves. 9 Of course, unions had an incentive to include
Black workers in order to bolster their ranks and strengthen their power,
but in many cases, unions could offset a potential loss of power from excluding Black workers by providing higher social status and higher wages
for their White members. Those railroads that had acceded to White union demands could still extract profit at some level. Although those firms
that put Black workers into unskilled positions had to pay White workers
higher wages, a segmented market would have also been able to provide
the railroads with a ready stable of strike-breakers to undercut the union's
position. In contrast to the standard story, discrimination might have paid
off.
This Article argues that we can better understand historical racial
discrimination if we frame it as the anti-competitive work of racial cartels.
The activity of a range of all-White groups, like homeowners' associations, unions, school boards, local political parties, city councils, and other
racially exclusive groups can usefully be described as cartel conduct.These
groups gained significant social, economic and political profit-higher
wages, higher property values, greater political power-from excluding on
the basis of race.
In what way do these groups' activities resemble those of market
cartels? In theoretical terms, racial cartels generated profit in the same way
that market cartels do-by restricting supply and manipulating price.
Homeowners' associations worked to create a racially segmented housing
market by limiting the pool of buyers. Unions excluded Blacks to create a
dual labor market. White political parties pushed Black voters off the rolls
to consolidate the power of the Democratic Party in Southern states.
Racial cartels also provided White cartel members with higher profits, if not higher prices. In housing markets, a segmented market provided
Whites with higher property values.' ° In labor markets, restricting the
supply of skilled workers brought higher wages." Far from costing Whites
to discriminate, exclusion paid significant dividends.
Describing historical anti-competitive conduct as the work of racial
cartels pays off in three distinct ways. First, the analogy helps us to underSee Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market, 37
9.
AM. Soc. REv. 547 (1972) (arguing that ethnic antagonism germinates in a labor market
split along ethnic lines because of economic competition).
10.
See Linda Brewster Stearns & John Logan, The Racial Structuring of the Housing
Market and Segregation in Suburban Areas, 65 Soc. FoRCEs 28 (1986) (arguing that segregation created a dual housing market); Douglas S. Massey, Gretchen A. Condran & Nancy
A. Denton, The Effect of Residential Segregation on Black Social and Economic Well-Being, 66
Soc. FORCES 29, 37-38 (1987) (noting that median housing values and rental values, plus
other features of the neighborhoods, were far lower for Black neighborhoods than for
Whites).
11.
See Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Ethnic Antagonismi: The Split Labor Market, 37
Am. Soc. REV. 547 (1972) (arguing that labor markets were segmented to the benefit of
Whites in terms of higher wages).
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stand how Whites benefitted from exclusion socially, economically and
politically. A racial cartel story emphasizes that, contrary to standard economic theory, exclusion might have paid off handsomely for Whites, in
terms of property values, wages, status and political power.
Second, a cartel story moves beyond individual, intentionalist accounts to focus on group conduct and collective action. Many theoretical
accounts of discrimination focus on the individual firm or actor's actions
and motivations. 2 A cartel story, which maps the collective dynamics of
racial exclusion, better matches the historical accounts of group conduct.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the story of racial cartels focuses on the unfair, anti-competitive effects of racial exclusion. In doing
so, the analogy potentially helps us to frame anti-discrimination law as a
species of anti-trust law, designed to correct market failure and restore
market competition.
Part I of this Article develops in more detail the theory of racial cartels, and the analogy to market cartels. Many all-White groups functioned
effectively as cartels for anti-competitive purposes. These groups used
many of the same anti-competitive strategies as do ordinary market cartels. These groups also monitored their members and enforced cartel rules
against them in many of the same ways as ordinary market cartels.
Parts II and III take up two technical problems, both of which relate
to cartel stability and the incentive of members to defect and sell across
racial lines. Part II examines the collective action problem of cooperation.
Why did cartel members cooperate with other members in refusing to
sell across racial boundaries? This section explores the way in which a
wide range of punishments-legal, social and economic-kept racial cartel members in line.
Part III investigates the related collective action problem of punishment. Why did cartel members punish those who broke cartel rules and
sold across racial boundaries? This section argues that internalized norms
of racial identity, and attendant feelings of guilt and shame, played an important role in solving both first and second-order problems.
Part IV investigates two case studies of racial cartels in action:
homeowners' associations in Chicago and political parties in Texas. The
history of these two groups suggests that viewing discrimination as the
work of racial cartels more usefully describes how discrimination played
out in practice.

12.
See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1971) (arguing that
the market will drive out discrimination that is based on individual tastes for discrimination), KENNETH J. ARROW, THE THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS (0.
Ashenfelter & A. Rees eds. 1973) (arguing that individual employers discriminate on the
basis of a statistical likelihood that workers of color are less productive.)
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The argument that discrimination benefitted Whites more than it
cost them runs contrary to much of conventional economic thinking.
Neoclassical economics teaches us that market competition should eliminate racial discrimination because discriminating is expensive. Economist
Gary Becker famously argued that people with a "taste" for discrirruination will have to pay an extra cost for indulging this preference, and will
thereby compete less effectively than participants without this costly preference.13 For example, employers who want to discriminate in hiring have
to pay an additional cost if they refuse to hire non-Whites, in part because
hiring from a more limited labor pool will be more expensive. Ultimately,
over time, firms that do not discriminate will supplant firms that do discriminate in a survival-of-the-fittest competition.
But the concept of racial cartels turns this neoclassical story on its
head.The cartel story suggests that racism might actually benefitWhitesby helping them monopolize higher wages and better jobs-rather than
costing them. As Gary Becker himself has acknowledged, the question of
collective action poses a significant challenge to his theory about markets
and discrimination . To explain why, it might be helpful to first say a few
words about cartels and about the role they play in market competition.
Economists typically define a cartel as a group of actors who work
together to extract monopoly profits by limiting competition and restricting supply. For example, OPEC, the oil-producing cartel, restricts the
output of oil by its members in order to raise prices." Cartels can adopt
many types of agreements, ranging from an informal gentlemen's agreement to a far more formal contractual agreement covering supply, pricing
and a range of other areas.16 Cartels can be primarily defensive, organized
to gain a competitive advantage in a chronically depressed market, or they
can operate more offensively to gain leverage during both good and bad
economic times. Cartels can be state-sponsored, using state law to run

13.
See BECKER, supra note 7, at 43-45. See also JOSEPH STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 410
(1993). Becker actually hypothesized that market monopolies as a species of market failure
would permit individuals to indulge in a "taste" for discrimination. See BECKER, supra note
7, at 46-47.
14.
According to Becker, understanding the scope and incidence of collective action against people of color "is perhaps the most important remaining gap in the analysis
of the economic position of minorities." See BECKER, supra note 7, at 8.
15.
See THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 206-11
(Peter Newman ed., 1998). For a much fuller discussion of cartel definitions, and proof of
the existence of cartels under US and European Community law, see Maurice Guertin &
Georgios Kyriazis, Cartels: Proof and Procedural Issues, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 266
(1992/1993).
16.

GEORGE W.

STOCKING &

MYRON W.

WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION:

STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 5-10

(1946).

CASE
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cartel operations, or they can use trust and other more informal means of
cooperation to hold the cartel together."
Scholarship from a range of disciplines supports the analogy between racial discrimination and market cartel conduct. In some of his
early work, economist Lester Thurow described several types of anticompetitive strategies that Whites had pursued during the era of Jim
Crow to increase their income and social status.' 8 Thurow included employment discrimination (which produced better jobs for Whites),
occupational discrimination (which generated higher wages), and capital
market discrimination (which permitted Whites to more easily borrow or
invest equal amounts of funds at better rates than Blacks). 9
Like Thurow, legal scholar Robert Cooter has argued that discriminatory groups resemble cartels when the members of the group benefit
from reducing competition with outsiders for business 20 Likewise, Richard McAdams has proposed that groups exclude on the basis of race for
purposes of producing social status, and that social norms are an effective
way to police cartel members. 2' A number of sociologists and social psychologists have also theorized that closing group membership to outsiders
often works to create competitive advantage.22
Describing this coordinated exclusion as cartel conduct can help us
to better understand the role that groups played in perpetuating discrimination. More precisely, we can define racial cartels as groups in which
members agree to artificially fix wages, property values, political power
and other price-like analogues, by restricting supply, dividing up markets,
or colluding to achieve other commercial conditions.
Like market
17.
See id.
18.
The era ofJiin Crow, commonly understood to be from 1877-1954, was notable for the dramatic increase of racial segregation, after a brief period of relative racial
progress during Recomtruction. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW (2001).
19.
See LESTER C. THUROW, POVERTY AND DIsCRIMINATION 118-26 (1969).
20.
See ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 343-46 (2000). See also
Robert Cooter, Market Affirniative Action, 31 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 133, 150 (1994).
21.
See Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1995).
22.
Frank Parkin, Randall Collins and Robert Murphy draw on and extend the
work of Max Weber on closure, to argue that closure is essential to monopolizing scarce
resources and opportunities. See Frank Parkin, Strategies of Social Closure in Class Fonnation,
in THE SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF CLASS STRUCTURE 1 (Frank Parkin ed., 1974); ROBERT MURPHY, SOCIAL CLOSURE: THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIZATION AND EXCLUSION (1988);
RANDALL COLLINS, CONFLICT SOCIOLOGY: TOWARDS AN EXPLANATORY SCIENCE (1975).
23.
See Freedom Holdings v. Spitzer, 447 F. Supp. 2d 230, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(defining a cartel as a combination of producers or producers that join together to control
a product's price or production). The European Commission defines a cartel as "an illegal

secret agreement concluded between competitors to fix prices, restrict supply and/or
divide up markets. The agreement may take a wide variety of forms but often relates to
sales prices or increases in such prices, restrictions on sales or production capacities,
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cartels, racial cartels use standard anti-competitive strategies-harassment,
boycotts, interference with contract, violence-to exclude non-group
members. Most importantly, these groups engage in racial exclusion not
because they have a taste for discrimination or because they are irrational,
but because they derive significant economic, social and political benefits.
Consider the example of a White homeowner's association in Chicago, operating during the era of Jim Crow (a case study that is examined
in more detail in the last section of this Article). 24 The typical Chicago
homeowners' association looked very much like a cartel designed to keep
Blacks out of the White housing market. Homeowners' associations divided up their turf on geographic lines, much as market cartels do, for
purposes of efficient monitoring and enforcing.The homeowners' association also used standard, anti-competitive tactics to keep potential Black
homebuyers from moving into White neighborhoods.
Physical and econonic harassment and coercion were favored association tactics. Members monitored who had come into the
neighborhood looking to buy housing, and whose children had begun to
attend school. Group members would approach prospective buyers or
actual buyers to convince them to sell their property to the association.
For more persistent buyers, members coordinated as a group to harass
them, often terrorizing them physically.2"
Economic coercion was particularly favored by the association.
Homeowners worked together with real estate boards and banks to restrict Black access to capital. Banks targeted their loans to Whites and to
White neighborhoods, where profits were more likely given higher property values. And of course, the association played a key role in persuading
homeowners to adopt racially restrictive covenants to prohibit members
from selling across racial lines.26
This anti-competitive conduct, and the dual housing market it created, paid off in several ways. First, White homeowners acquired a
monopoly in the best housing stock. The Black housing market contained
inferior housing stock in older neighborhoods, where a White market
contained bigger and newer housing on larger pieces of land. By keeping
sharing out of product or geographic markets or customers, and collusion on the other
commercial conditions for the sale of products or services." Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust:
Commission Action Against Cartels-Questions and Answers, EUROPA (Jan. 28, 2009),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/ 32 &format=HT
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
24.
Please see Part Ill for more detail.
25.
See DONALD S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 35-37 (Harvard University Press, 1993);

See generally Zorita Mikva, The Neighborhood Improvement Association: A CounterForce to the Expansion of Chicago's Negro Population (1951) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
University of Chicago) (on file with Chicago: Library Dept. of Photographic Reproduction).
26.
See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 25, at 37.
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Blacks out ofWhite neighborhoods,White homeowners' associations kept
the best housing and property for themselves.
Second, by creating a dual housing market, association members
monopolized access to wealthier neighbors. Differences in wealth were
(and are still) quite large, owing to historical discrimination. The benefits
that come with wealthier neighbors-lower tax rates, higher tax revenues
and well-funded public amenities among other things-were reserved for
Whites alone.28
Third, White association members acquired a monopoly on the
higher property values associated with a relatively wealthier White neighborhood. To be sure, much of the property value could be traced to racial
preferences for living with White neighbors, and the self-fulfilling prophecy that property values would drop with the entrance of Black
neighbors.2 9 But White homeowners also had a monopoly on the neighborhoods with bigger houses and parcel sizes, wealthier neighborhoods,
better public goods and/or lower tax bases. Beyond intrinsic or selffulfilling preferences, a house in a White neighborhood was materially
worth more. 3
Importantly, by coordinating to exclude, buyers and sellers reduced
the threat of uncertain property values that would exist if neighborhoods
could not be marketed as definitively White communities. Blockbusting
often caused property values in tipping neighborhoods to dramatically fall
as non-Whites moved in. Cartel conduct stabilized property values and
dramatically reduced blockbusting as White homeowners coordinated to
sell only to White buyers.'
It is important to note that racial cartels benefitted primarily working and middle-class Whites-the immigrant homeowner seeking to
secure property values in his neighborhood, the yeoman farmer looking
to consolidate political power with plantation elites, the skilled craft
worker bargaining against the employer for higher wages.32 Working and
middle-class Whites looked to cartels to protect their fragile material gains
as they moved to the suburbs and worked their way up the economic
27.
See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 25, at 41.
28.
See id.
See generally Mary R. Jackman & Robert W. Jackman, Racial Inequalities in
29.
Home Ownership, 58 Soc. FORCES 1221, 1227-30 (1980) (documenting property value
differences between Black and White homes).
30.
See generally Michael Schill & Susan Wachter, Housing Market Constraints and
Racial Stratification by Income and Race, 6 Hous. PoL'Y DEBATE 141 (1995) (arguing that the
correlation between income and race meant Whites enjoyed higher quality housing); See
also Massey, Condran and Denton, THE EFFECT OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION, supra note
10.
31.
See BECKER, supra note 7, at 19-38.
32.
See, e.g., Gretchen Boger, Thie Meaning of Neighborhood in the Modern City, 35 J.
URB. HIST. 236 (2009) (arguing that middle and working class Whites advocated for and
benefitted from the Baltimore segregation ordinance, and that no elite Whites did so).
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ladder. In particular, they wanted to shore up their vulnerable property
values and status as homeowners, their uncertain political power, their
wages, and their social status as skilled workers. 33 Far from being merely
psychological or status-oriented, the so-called wages of Whiteness during
31
Jim Crow were made up of actual material wages.
To be sure, the analogy between racial cartels and ordinary market
cartels is far from perfect. This Article does not mean to suggest that
homeowners' associations functioned technically as cartels. More specifically, the cartel account does not conform to the precise technical
definitions of cartel conduct. Critics will point out, for example, that in
housing markets, a homeowners' association cannot properly be described
as a racial cartel because White homeowners will be both buyers and
sellers in this market, and have no incentive to pay higher prices when
they are buyers." These critics will also point out, correctly, that the price
and the restriction of supply in market cartels do not always have obvious
or technically precise analogues in the context of race.
At the same time, the analogy captures far better than standard accounts the competitive advantage and collective dynamic of racial
exclusion. In the housing market, at the level of the individual homeowners' association, White members of the association had an incentive to
keep property values high, both as potential sellers and as potential borrowers against the value of the property.
As future homeowners, these same Whites also had a strong interest
in low prices for housing in good neighborhoods. But even as future buyers, these Whites might well have preferred to buy in neighborhoods with
a strong homeowners' association, in order to protect the value of their
home once they had bought.36 In addition, future homeowners in certain
cities might not have had the option to buy outside the jurisdiction of an
association. In any event, although the cartel story might not fit perfectly,
describing a homeowners' association as a cartel usefully focuses on the
property value payoffs and collective dynamics of exclusion, aspects that
are obscured by irrational animus accounts of discrimination.
Intuitively, the cartel story of racial exclusion seems to provide additional explanatory power beyond "tastes for discrimination" or standard
stories about intrinsic animus. But before signing off on the idea of racial

See DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF
33.
THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (Verso rev. ed., 1999) (arguing that working-class Whites

enjoyed psychological "wages" in terms of status position by excluding on the basis of
race).
34.
See id.
Thanks to Daniel Klerman and Matthew Spitzer for raising this point.
35.
36.
To be even more precise, in tenms of incentives, the prospective homeowner
should have looked to find a neighborhood with a homeowners' association that was
weak on the day that she closed her purchase, and then dramatically stronger on the day
after her purchase.
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cartels, we first need to work through some theoretical questions about
cartel stability. In the strictly neoclassical view, cartels do not exist, or if
they do, they dissolve quickly because members have a strong self-interest
in defecting or letting other members do all of the work. The next section
explores cartel stability, and the roles that law and racial identity might
have played in keeping racial cartels together.
II.

CHEATER, CHEATER:THE PROBLEM OF THE UNSTABLE CARTEL

Over the last thirty years, neoclassical theorists have developed the
theoretical case against cartels, arguing mostly that cartels are inherently
unstable. In this vein, scholars make three basic claims.37
First, to form a coherent group, cartel members have to coordinate
carefully. Group members need to make sure they are all on the same
page with regard to the rules of engagement, e.g., whether the rules require members to sell products at below cost or alternatively restrict
output, in order to drive out
a competitor. Economic theorists call this
"the coordination problem., 38
Second, in operation, cartels face "the free-rider problem." Freeriders are group members who will cheat on cartel agreements when
cheating is profitable. 39 As anyone who has ever joined a group knows
from experience, every member of the cartel has a reason to free-ride on
other members of the cartel. The work to maintain a cartel is costly, and
cartels take a lot of work to maintain.Any individual member will benefit
by letting the other members do all of the work while they enjoy all of
the benefits.40 Cartels have to figure out how to get members to do cartel
work without free-riding on other members."
Third and similarly, cartels must contend with "the defection problem." Beyond shirking, cartel members often face a strong temptation to
defect or abandon the cartel altogether when it pays off to do so.42 For
example, abiding by supply restrictions to keep the price high means that
a member of OPEC must give up the profits they would gain if they sold

See D.K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 835 (1976).
See AVINASH K. DIx1T & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1991); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (Harv. U. Press 1960).
39.
Mancur Olson has famously described the free-rider problem at length. See
37.
38.

MANCUR OLSON,

THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY

oF GROUPS 21-36 (1971).

40.

See id.

41.

Robert Cooter notes that the free-rider problem likely besets discriminatory

groups. See COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 346.
42.
See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L.
524-25 (2004).

REV.

515,
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all the oil that the country could supply.4a Abiding by cartel agreements

often requires cartel members to forgo immediate individual profit for
longer-term gain. In game theory terms, scholars view membership in a
cartel as a combination of the prisoner's dilemma and a coordination
game.
Notwithstanding their supposed instability, cartels have had long and
fruitful lives in a wide range of markets, from sugar, rubber, and steel to
electric lamps, aluminum, chemicals, and explosives. Indeed, some market
cartels like DeBeers, in diamonds, and OPEC, in oil, have been around for
several decades.
How then do we account for cartel stability in real life? For most
theorists on the subject, the answer lies in punishment." Particularly for
larger groups, punishment persuades group members to cooperate, even
when to do so is costly to the member. If cartel members face sufficiently
high punishment that it offsets the benefits of defecting or free-riding,
then members are likely to comply with cartel rules to exclude nonmembers.4" While punishment cannot be the sole answer, as the next section will point out, punishment is a key part of the cartel stability story.
A review of the literature suggests that racial cartels may have used
three different types of punishment strategies to stabilize themselves: (i)
the use of public law; (ii) the use of private law, and in particular, contracts; and (iii) the use of moralistic group social norms connected to
group identity and ideology. The following discussion suggests that much
like market cartels, racial cartels deployed these strategies to keep White
cartel members in line.
A. Public Law
Public law has been quite useful in helping to stabilize ordinary
market cartels. In the 1930s, for example, government laws required domestic sugar production to conform to cartel-set numbers, which helped
to stabilize the international sugar cartel and keep cartel members on the
same strategic page. Here, the government was responsible for monitorSee id. The problem of defection is well known in the collective action litera43.
ture. See, e.g., SCHELLING, supra note 38, at 57-58; see also ROBERT AXELROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 13-14 (1984).
44.
The earliest game theorists noted that punishment was an effective way to solve
the prisoner's dilenna. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy, Tactics, and Non-Zero Sutn Thteory,
in THEORY OF GAMES: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 469, 475-79 (1964); EDNA
ULLMANN-MARCALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 33-35 (1977). Cartel theorists agreed.
See Osborne, supra note 37, at 838-41; Leslie, supra note 42, at 528.
45.
See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion,
87 COLuM. L. REV. 295 (1987).
46.
See Kurt Wilk, The International Sugar Reginte, 33 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 860, 87173 (1939).
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57

ing cartel members' compliance and for punishing those who produced
more than the cartel agreement allowed.
Just as in market monopolies, racial cartels have used public law to
force members to "agree" to exclude non-group members. To take the
most obvious example, White homeowners and developers worked
together to enact segregation ordinances in cities like Baltimore,
Winston-Salem, Atlanta,47 and Louisville.48 Some zoning ordinances reserved particular areas for Black and White residents, while others
prohibited Blacks from moving into blocks where a greater number of
Whites than Blacks resided.
At least until being outlawed by the Supreme Court,49 segregation
ordinances solved cartel stability problems quite easily. Whites did not
have the choice to sell to Blacks-they were legally prohibited from doing so. Cartel members were relieved of much of the work of monitoring
and enforcing-taxpayer money and law enforcement did much of the
work.
Beyond enforcement, racial cartels also used public law directly to
restrict competition by White planters for Black labor.White planters persuaded state legislatures to enact the Black Codes just after the Civil War. °
The Codes strictly enforced contracts between planters and labor, and
limited negotiation over labor contracts to the beginning of the agricultural year. Other statutes also prevented labor recruiters from "enticing"
away labor, and pushed workers back on the plantation through vagrancy
prohibitions.5'
At least one scholar has argued that both the Black Codes and the
longer lasting anti-enticement and anti-vagrancy statutes were basically
anti-competitive agreements to hold down Black wages and to keep former slave labor on the farm.5 2 Given the uncertain labor supply at the end
of the war, planters would ordinarily have had to compete for labor by
paying higher wages. The statutes regulating Black labor preempted this
wage war through the machinery of federal law. Without the statutes,
planters would have had to compete with each other to assure adequate

47.
See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 25, at 41 (documenting that segregation
ordinances in these cities reserved some neighborhoods for Blacks and others for Whites).
48.
See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70-72 (1917) (describing the Louisville
ordinance, which the Court struck down as unconstitutional).
49.
See id.
50.
For a discussion of the Black Codes, see HAROLD D. WOODMAN, NEW
SOUTH-NEw
POSTBELLUM

LAW: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CREDIT AND LABOR RELATIONS IN THE

AGRICULTURAL SOUTH (1995); AMy DRU STANLEY,

FROM BONDAGE

TO

CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPA-

(1998). See also Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative
of Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (1984).
51.
See Roback, supra note 50, at 1162.
52.
See id.
TION
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labor at harvest time." With the relevant statutes in place, planters avoided
a strategic arms race of higher wages in which each planter would have
tried to outbid the other.
B. Private Law
Private contracts can also help stabilize a cartel.With regard to cartel
contracts, individuals do the cartel monitoring, but the government provides the third-party enforcement power. In regular market cartels, private
contracts to divide up territory are standard procedure. In 1920, for example, explosives manufacturers DuPont (in the U.S.) and the Nobel
Dynamite Trust Company (in Europe) agreed to divide territories for
explosives among themselves. The parties also exchanged exclusive crosslicenses for present and future patents in order to sell each other's products on their home turf.54 Predictably, these under-the-table agreements
undermined real competition in the explosives markets.55
Like the explosives cartel, racial cartels also used private contractsmost notably, the racially restrictive covenant-to solve cartel stability
problems. During Jim Crow, White homeowners negotiated private
covenants with each other to prohibit the sale of homes in White
neighborhoods across racial lines to Blacks, Mexicans and Asians." As part
of the contract to buy a house, White homebuyers agreed not to sell their
property in the future to non-White buyers.57
Like cross-licensing, racially restrictive covenants tied neighbors to
each other through private agreement. Such agreements were enforced
not by the previous owner, but by the "third party beneficiary" neighbors,
who presumably had relied on the all-White character of the neighborhood when deciding to buy. 8 The threat of potential litigation from
neighbors served to scare homeowners who might otherwise have sold to
a willing non-White buyer.55 Part IV will address restrictive covenants
more extensively.
53.
TION IN

54.

See LESTER C. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY: MECHANISMS
THE U.S. ECONOMY 167 (1975).
See STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 16, at 439-40.

OF DISTRIBU-

55.
See id.
Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892), records the case of a re56.
strictive covenant that prohibited the sale of property to Chinese residents in California.
Clfiton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), discusses a restrictive covenant
that prohibited sale to persons of "Mexican descent" in Texas. Restrictive covenants prohibiting sale to Blacks were numerous, and were only invalidated in 1948, in the case of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
See discussion supra Part 1.
57.
58.
See Shelley, 334 U.S. 1.
59.
Richard Brooks has argued that, even after restrictive covenants were outlawed
in Shelley v. Kraemer, restrictive covenants continued to produce residential segregation by
signaling the racial exclusivity of White communities, and by functioning as an informal
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C. Social Incentives

Beyond public and private law, market cartels over the years have also used informal social incentives to solve stability problems, by socially
rewarding those who abided by the agreements, and socially punishing
those who did not. 60 For example, in American Column and Lumber v. US.,
a hardwood trade association used "business honor and social penalties" to
enforce anti-competitive agreements among association members. 6' Even
more informally, market cartels have often relied on ordinary social trust
to hold members to their obligations.62
As in market cartels, social norms can play an important role in racial cartels as well. 63 Legal scholar Richard McAdams has argued that
social esteem and disesteem can work to enforce a racial group's agreement to exclude other races. 64 According to McAdams, people convey
approval and good will towards other group members who comply with
the group norm to exclude, and will shame or shun those who cross racial
lines. Similarly, those members6 who serve as cartel enforcers get social
approval for their hard work. ' Even if social norms are insufficient on
their own, they can supplement more formal legal regulations to create
cartel stability.
Of course, whether social incentives actually work depends very
much on group members' willingness to reward each other with esteem
or shame. Even the activity of esteeming and disesteeming takes work. In
particular, keeping track of who has crossed racial lines and who has not
takes time and energy. Often, shaming requires extra work-homeowners'
associations, for example, often published the names of defecting members
in a local newsletter.66 And of course, group members will shirk work if
they can get away with it.
social norm enforced via social sanctions and incentives. See Richard R. W. Brooks, Covenants & Conventions (Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Research Paper No. 02-8,
2002).
60.
See OLSON, supra note 39, at 60.
61.
Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411 (1921)
62.
See Leslie, supra note 43, at 547.
63.
See Robert Boyd & Peter Richerson, Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable Groups, 13

ETHNOLOGY AND

SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1992).

64.
See McAdams, supra note 21, at 1044. McAdams argues that groups compete to
produce relative social status, rather than material benefits like jobs, education and housing. See id.
65.
See id. at 1046.
66.
Phillip Pettit and Geoff Brennan, like Richard McAdams, have argued that the
basic work of esteem and dis-esteem does not require any expenditure, and for that reason, social approval constitutes a cost-free mechanism to punish. See PHILLIP PETTIT &
GEOFF BRENNAN,

THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM: AN ESSAY ON CIviL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY

(2004). However, McAdams concedes that in certain instances, group members may be
asked to incur costs in monitoring norm violation (when the violation is not public or

60
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How can cartels solve this second order problem of getting members to punish cartel cheaters? Some evolutionary psychologists and
cultural anthropologists have suggested that humans have evolved a tendency to punish cheaters-a so-called "cheater mechanism" that makes
people willing to punish those who violate group norms or who do not
reciprocate when provided benefits.6" A wide range of experimental litat
erature documents that people will punish those who don't cooperate
68
some significant cost to themselves, even in one-off interactions.
The next section explores an alternative explanation, one still at least
tangentially rooted in a rational choice framework. In particular, this section explores the way in which internal rewards and punishments can
help to explain both why people cooperate and why they punish.
11.

SOLVING THE PUNISHMENT PROBLEMVIA INTERNAL IDENTITY NORMS

Any social norm that depends on members' willingness to monitor
and police each other will inevitably face free-rider problems. The ability
to internalize social norms so that they constitute internal sources of
guidance can help to solve some of these problems. Internalized norms do
not rely on other members to monitor or enforce; by definition they are
self-enforcing. Although internalized norms take a lot of work to put in
place, much of that work tends to be spread more evenly among group
members (parents, teenage cohort, schools, churches), who do the work of
socializing children and young adults.
First, some preliminary theory about internalized norms. Theorists
have described norms as regular cultural practices that are accompanied
by a set of punishment and rewards. 69 For most theorists, internalization
is a process in which norms that are enforced externally by others come
to be incorporated, and enforced, from within a person's internal psychological framework. 7 The internalization process centrally involves
obvious) and in enforcing punishment mechanisms. Conversation with Richard McAdams, March 25, 2009.
67.
See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Change, in
THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE
163, 199 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992); ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON,
THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF CULTURES 264-66 (2005) (developing a cultural group
selection account in which genes and culture co-evolve to produce the tendency to punish defectors).

68.
See ELINOR OSTROM, JAMES GARDNER & ROY WALKER, RULES, GAMES AND
COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Altruistic Punishment in
Humans, 415 NATURE 137 (2002).
69.
See ULLMAN-MARGALIT, supra note 43 at 12-13; Richard McAdams, The Origins, Emergence, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV., 338, 351 (1997).
70.
Roy Schafer argues that internalization is a process in which external regulatory
interactions in a person's external environment become transformed into internal regulatory interactions within the self. ROY SCHAFER, ASPECTS OF INTERNALIZATION 9 (1968).
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both external pressure and internal transformative processes like identi7
fication. 1
People are socialized to internalize norms in a myriad of ways, but
three primary channels stand out. Children are socialized to adopt norms
by their parents (which some experts describe as vertical transmission).
Children and young adults are also socialized by other adults, both in their
parents' generation (oblique transmission) and by people in their own
generation (horizontal transmission, a mode particularly salient during
teenage years) 2 Importantly, the degree of socialization will depend on
the number of people in a child's community who have both adopted the
norm and are willing to punish or reward on the basis of the norm.
The key feature of internalized norms is that once norms are internalized, compliance no longer exclusively depends on external
enforcement. When a norm has become fully internalized, a person will
experience guilt, shame and anxiety for violating the norm, whether or
not an external enforcement mechanism exists. 7' Likewise, a person will
experience self-esteem and validation when she complies with the norm,
regardless of whether anyone observes her. For example, a real estate broker who refuses to sell across racial lines might feel good for doing so, and
might experience some degree of shame and guilt if he does sell. Internal
incentives are a cheap and efficient way for cartels to operate. The group
member monitors and enforces the group's rules all on his own!
Of course, it takes work for groups to socialize their members to internalize norms, but groups can delegate much of that work to
institutions. For example, the National Association of Real Estate Boards
and its membership in Chicago carried the laboring oar to socialize real
estate brokers not to betray their White homeowner constituencies by
selling across racial lines. To engage the full power of moralism in the
Moore and Fine see internalization as a process in which aspects of a person's outer world
and interactions with external processes are absorbed and presented in a person's internal
structure. BURNESS E. MOORE & BERNARD D. FINE, PSYCHOANALYTIC TERMS AND CON-

102-03 (1990). Sue Walrond-Skinner defines internalization as a process in which a
person transfers her relationship with an external object into her internal world. SUE
CEPTS

WALROND-SKINNER, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 186 (1986).

71.
See SCHAFER, supra note 68, at 9 (internal); WILLIAM W. MEISSNER, INTERNALIZATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS (1981) (external). For an extensive and detailed treatment
about the processes of internalization, see KENNETH C. WALLIS & JAMES L. PULTON, INTERNALIZATION
(2001). See also JOAN GRUSEC & PAUL HASTINGS, HANDBOOK OF
SOCIALIZATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH (2007).
72.
See LUIGI LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA & MARCUS FELDMAN, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH (1981).
73.
See Nancy Eisenberg, Emotion, Regulation and Moral Development, 51 ANN. REV.
PSYCH. 665, 667 (2000). Sheldon Stryker has laid out many of these key concepts in his
book SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: A SOCIAL STRUCTURAL VERSION (1980). Robert Cooter
has relied on the concept of norm internalization in discussing the law and economics of

informal norms. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic
Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000).
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socialization process, the group adopted as part of its ethics code a prohibition against selling across racial lines. 4
Norms about group identity and outsider exclusion appear to be
particularly easy to socialize. Experimental work in social psychology
suggests that in contests over scarce resources, group identity norms,
particularly norms to exclude, quickly become salient. In a now-famous
experiment by Muzafer Sherif, a group of boys in a summer camp mobilized norms of exclusion (based on the camp-designated group
memberships) when competing for prizes in camp activities 6 Sherif's
work shows that group members' identities can be quickly mobilized to
generate norms of in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, even
when membership designations are arbitrary and not salient in other settings.
The relationship between anti-competitive conduct and internalized
identity norms finds some support in earlier work by law and economics
scholars. Janet Landa has proposed that internalized norms about Chinese
identity improve the competitiveness of Chinese middlemen in various
countries. Landa argues that homogenous ethnic identity improves the
information dissemination in a group organized for economic
trust and
77
activity.
Likewise, Richard Posner has alluded to the role that identity might
play in the operation of a hypothetical medieval craft guild 8 Posner's hypothetical weaver's guild restricts the supply of cloth by forbidding
members to make cloth at night or on holidays, or to hire beyond the
minimum number of apprentices necessary to replace existing members.
The guild also requires its members to use only those tools that would
facilitate cloth production by hand. Members who violate such restrictions are shunned and expelled from the guild.
To promote compliance with these restrictions, and to keep supply
artificially low, Posner's guild deploys some very specific racialized norms
about the identity of "craftsmen" and the need to exclude non-craftsmen
from production, because of the inferior quality of cloth that would be
74.

See ittfra notes 139-141 and accompanying text for a discussion about the ethics

code.
For an excellent discussion about this work, which is called "realistic group
75.
conflict theory," see J.W Jackson, Realistic Group Conflict Theory: An Evaluation of the
Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 43 Psychological Record 395 (1993).

76.

See MUZAFER SHERIF, THE ROBBERS' CAVE EXPERIMENT: INTERGROUP CONFLICT

AND COOPERATION (1988). Sherif also found that the boys' group structure and their con-

flict with another group in camp were very nmuch influenced by their perception of
competitive threat. He also found that creating superordinate goals, requiring that competing groups work together on some common goal, lessened group conflict substantially
and affected group norms and group structure. See id.
77.
See Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: A it
InstitutionalAlternative to Contract Law, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981).

78.

See Richard Posner, The Material Basis ofJurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1993).
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produced by non-craftsmen. 79 Accordingly, the guild bars membership of
Jews and other "aliens" because, in the members' view, these groups will
not "share [with existing members] a common core of basic tastes and
values for quality."80 The guild protects racial identity boundaries by encouraging members to form a strong web of social relationships, with frefrequent intermarriage and the hiring of apprentices from guild member
families.8'
Much like Posner's exclusive guild and Landa's Chinese middlemen,
White racial cartels may well have used internalized social norms around
identity to create anti-competitive barriers to entry in key markets like
labor, housing and education. Keeping non-Whites out of the market became easier once the cartel had promoted internalized social norms about
why exclusion should be maintained.
Sociologist Rose Helper's brilliant 1969 study of Chicago real estate
brokers provides evidence that internal norms played an important role in
supplementing external sanctions for real estate boards. 82 Helper interviewed hundreds of segregation-era real estate brokers in Chicago about
their policies regarding sales to Black homebuyers. Most respondents said
they would not sell to Blacks, although a few gave a qualified yes. Moreover, brokers reported a variable set of rules about when property could
be sold to Blacks-for a considerable number of brokers, selling was permitted when it appeared that racial succession was inevitable.
Many Chicago brokers reported a fear of economic retaliation-loss
of clients, sources of mortgage funds, insurance, and property listings. An
even larger number of brokers feared social retaliation, including the
wrath of immediate neighbors, loss of social status with colleagues and the
community. As one broker described it, "you become a social outcast
among other real estate brokers. 83
But internal incentives did just as much work to police the real estate broker community in Chicago. Many brokers believed that it was
morally wrong to "hurt" White homeowners, or cause them emotional
upheaval, property loss and other harm. A significant number of respondents characterized cross-border selling as unethical, or as a betrayal of
trust. Several said their conscience would not allow them to sell, and others spoke of the need to respect neighbors and other property owners.84
Consistent with the notion that identity helps to hold cartels together, a number of brokers explicitly spoke about their identity as a
White person. As one broker put it, "[w]hether I'm a priest, a rabbi or a
79.
See
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
See
KERS (1969).
83.
See
84.
See

id.

ROSE HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND THE PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BRO-

id. at 137.
id. at 116-17.
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real estate man, I'm still a member of a race."'
their obligations as White real estate brokers:
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Other brokers spoke of

"No [r]ealtor objects to dealing with Negroes but we have that
certain obligation to 1hite people. The value of their property
goes down.You want their faith, their good will.You have an
obligation to your client, loyalty to your client. You have a
moral obligation
to your client not to break a block. It's an
8 6'
unwritten law.
Not all brokers held the line, however. Economic temptation proved
to be too much for some. Knowing that the community would retaliate,
the defectors created separate professional networks and sources of capital
81
to allow th6m to do business.
Once the defector brokers had sold a critical mass of houses in a
neighborhood (often three or more) to Black buyers, "respectable" brokers followed.88 Remarkably, according to Helper's survey, brokers found it
permissible according to their informal codes of conduct to sell in a
neighborhood that was already tipping. 9
The story of internalized norms itself presents important questions.
Why will group members (or the institutions to which they delegate)
engage in the time-consuming work of socializing other members to internalize norms? One answer might lie in cultural group selection-the
notion that those groups (homeowners' associations, unions, etc.) who
socialize their members fare much better in terms of competitive
advantage (wages, housing) than out-group members or other nonsocializing groups. 9° Another answer might point to the ideological
dimension of socialization, which becomes self-reinforcing when people
internalize norms about what it means to be good parents or good members of the group.91

mate

This Article does not follow these threads of inquiry to their ulticonclusion, and the account is for that reason necessarily

85.
See id. at 123.
86.
Id. at 119. (emphasis added).
87.
See id. See also Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requien for Blockbusting: Law, Economics and
Race-Based Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145 (1998) (arguing that blockbusting required brokers to maintain separate networks of support).
88.
See Helper, supra note 79, at 109-12.
See id.
89.
90.
See ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF
CULTURES (2005). For an excellent introduction to the idea of cultural group selection, see
ELLIOT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1999).

91.
For arguments with regard to parenting, see FRANCES CHAPUT WAKSLER, STUDYING THE SOCIAL WORLDS OF CHILDREN: SOCIOLOGICAL READINGS (2007) (suggesting that
much of socialization of children within parenting is motivated by ideological commitments to what constitutes good parenting).

FALL

2010]

Racial Cartels

incomplete. At the same time, even a partial understanding about the role
that law, informal norms and internal identity-based norms play in cartel
stability may help to shed light on the dynamics of historical racial exclusion.
The following section pursues the same goal by taking a much more
detailed look at the history of two racial cartels during the Jim Crow era:
White political parties in Texas and White homeowners' associations and
real estate boards in Chicago.
IV. CASE STUDIES: TWO CARTELS IN ACTION

To more fully understand the dynamics of racial cartel conduct operation, this section explores two case studies of cartels in action. First, this
section looks at a couple of all-White factions of the Democratic Party in
Fort Bend County, Texas. As the following discussion will describe at
length, these factions conspired in a mutual disarmament pact to disfranchise Black voters, largely to eliminate them as the potential swing vote
that could tip the party towards one faction or the other. Second, this
section examines Chicago homeowners' associations. These groups
collaborated to exclude Black residents from White neighborhoods, to
prop up property values and to monopolize access to wealthy neighbors
and well-funded public goods associated with wealthy neighbors.
As we will see in both of these case studies, racial identity and the
law both played central roles in cartel operation. In addition, the cartels in
both studies used violence and coercion to overcome members' temptation to cheat or defect from the organization.
But the cartels also differed significantly, particularly in the role that
the law played in cartel operations. For example, the law played a more
formal role in keeping together homeowners' associations in Chicago
than it did for Texas political parties. 92 In reading the following two sections, we should keep in mind that racial cartels varied significantly across
geography and time, and that historically specific events very much influenced the operation of each kind of cartel.
A. The South: Disfranchising Voters in Political Markets
The story of disfranchisement in Texas looks very much like a textbook case of racial cartel conduct. This is a story of Whites who managed
to unite across major class divides in order to keep Black voters off the
rolls. Their anti-competitive payoff: to disarm their most dangerous
92.
Compare infra note 109 and accompanying text (noting that renegade violence
controlled Texas political cartel stability) with infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text
(pointing to the racially restrictive covenant and its role in homeowner association efforts
to prevent defection).
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political competition, the "swing" Black vote. A closer look at Texas political history adds the all-important details.
Historians long have argued about what spurred Whites in the
South to disfranchise Blacks.93 Some have claimed that conservative
Democrats from the Black belt initiated the move to keep independent

parties from winning with the Black vote, for both political and statusrelated reasons.94 Others find it less important which groups initiated the
move, and more important that they did so to neutralize new Black voters. According to V.0. Key, "the sounder generalization is that the groups
on top at the moment, whatever their political orientation, feared that

their opponents might recruit Negro [sic] support."9'
Once back in power after the end of the war, Democrats had faced a

new and emerging split between elites and working class farmers in the
1880s and early 1890s. 96 Small farmers, who were having trouble holding

onto their land and keeping up their crop prices, increasingly began to pit
their interests squarely against elite planters, along with financiers in the

east and the increasingly pro-industrialist leadership of the Democratic
Party.97 Yeoman farmers formed the Southern Farmers' Alliance and the
Populist Party in the late 80s, and by 1889, the working-class farmer had
some form of representation in every state in the South.98
93.

See J. MORGAN KOUSSER,

THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS SUFFRAGE RE-

STRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910

6-8 (1974).

94.

See C. VANN WOODWARD, A HISTORY OF THE SOUTH, VOLUME IX: ORIGINS OF
THE NEW SOUTH, 1817-1913 222, 229 (1951); J. MORGAN KoUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS, supra note 90, at 16-17.

95.

See V.O.KY, JR.,

SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (A.A. Knopf ed.,

1977). Similarly, Michael Perman has suggested that the conservative Black-belt Democrats did not lead the movement in every state-in some states, like South Carolina and
Mississippi, independent dissenters spearheaded the push for disfranchisement, and
Black-belt Democrats opposed the move or were slow to join it. See MICHAEL PERMAN,
STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY, DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH 1888-1908 (2001).
96.
See WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, supra note 18, at 77;
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 283 (8th ed.
2000).
97.

See

FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM,

supra note 93, at 281; WOODWARD,

ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, supra note 91 at 192-93. The Southern Alliance joined

with the Western Farmer's Alliance to form the National Farmers' Alliance, and much
like the southerners, the national organization united small farm land owners with hired
hands to promote radical agrarian interests. See FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM,
supra note 93, at 284; WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, supra note 91, at 193,

246. A range of other economic programs produced independent movements as well.
Morgan Kousser chronicles the rise of the Readjusters in Virginia, the Greenbacks in a
number of southern states, the anti-prohibitionists in North Carolina, in Florida, those
opposed to land giveaways, and the Agricultural Wheel in Arkansas (which eventually
became part of the Farmers' Alliance). See KOUSSER, SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS,
supra note 90 at 25; See also WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, supra note

18, at 60.
98.
See FRANKLIN,

FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM, supra note 93, at 284
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Once in place, these two Democratic factions--working-class
farmer and elite planter/industrialist-began to openly compete for political power by aggressively going after the newly-emancipated Black vote.
The Populist Party tried to unite with Black voters in Georgia,Texas and
Arkansas, despite the loss of prestige the party risked by crossing racial
lines. 99 Not to be outdone, Conservative Democrats also went after the
Black vote, sometimes secretly, sometimes openly.'00 Even at this early
stage, some conservatives contemplated disfranchisement. But even
though they saw the potential advantage to exclusion, they feared more
the force of the newly enacted Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.'0 '
In 1890, the period of open competition formally began to give
way. Mississippi was the first to amend its Constitution to impose poll
taxes and literacy tests to keep Blacks from voting. Over the next two
decades, the rest of the South followed suit, including Texas, a state in
which anti-competitive efforts came to a head just after the turn of the
102
century.
The rest of our cartel story picks up in the Lone Star state. At the
dawn of the era of exclusion in Texas, the split between small White
farmer and elite White producer had become ungovernable. In the 1896
election, these two Democratic factions went to war with each other, using violence and intimidation, among other anti-competitive tactics, to
try to consolidate an advantage. °3 At the same time, Black voters were
beginning to wield significant power, or at least enough to be dangerous.
Black Republicans already provided a constant but small opposition to
White elite Democrats. Black voters posed an even greater threat to elite
interests when they supported third-parties like the GreenbacksIndependents, the Farmers'Aliance and Populists.
In response to this threat, Texas Democrats in 1902 passed legislation
setting up a poll tax and a secret ballot for general elections and primaries.
Soon after, Democrats unleashed an even more potent weapon: the White
primary. Taking many different forms, the White primary essentially restricted primary elections (or pre-primary nominations) to White voters
only. By essentially guaranteeing White victory in elections, the White
99.

See

WOODWARD,

ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH,

WOODWARD, STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW,

100.

supra note 91, at 236, 256;

supra note 18, at 60.

See id.

101.
See FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM, supra note 94, at 281
102.
See KousSER, SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS, supra note 90, at 196. To be
sure, Texas was the least "Southern" of the southern states, and had internalized far less of
the fixed racial attitude and the hierarchical elitst power structure, having had a relatively
shorter experience with slavery. But competition among Whites was, as a result, far more

open and a Democratic victory less assured than in other states. White democrats struggled repeatedly against a coalition of poor Whites and Blacks (and in some cases
Mexicans) for power and office, and the third-party movement was stronger in Texas
than anywhere else in the South. Id. at 97.
103.
Id.
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primary neutralized the growing power of the Black vote. Neutralizing
the Black vote soon became1 04the centerpiece of White strategy in Democratic politics for all factions.
In 1923, an all-White Texas legislature passed a law that unambiguously prohibited Black participation in a Democratic Party primary
election held in the state.10' The Supreme Court quickly stepped in to
block this move, ruling in Nixon v. Herndon that the primary
law violated
16
the equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment.
The legislature and the Court went at each other for several more
rounds before Texans were able to craft a White primary that the Supreme
Court found to be constitutional. 0 7 But a short time later, the Court reversed itself, finding that the state had so pervasively controlled the
primary process that even ostensibly private action constituted illegal state
action that violated the equal protection clause.'0 8
Thwarted by the Supreme Court's rulings, Whites now turned to
more local versions of the White primary. In Fort Bend County, Texas, for
example, local Whites formed two groups, which were divided along class
lines. The more numerous faction, the Jaybirds, consisted of four hundred
or so of the county's wealthier property owners. Almost all were Democrats and all were White, as required by the organization's membership
rules.'0 9 From the beginning, the Jaybird party looked just like an ordinary
political party, with an executive committee, a regular primary, and ex-

104.
Competition for Black votes first became a real issue during the election of
1892, and some Black officials were voted in during this election. Id. at 198.
105.
For a detailed review of the history of the White primary, see DARLENE CLARK
HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS (KTO

Press 1979) (2003).
106.
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
107.
Not to be deterred, the legislature immediately passed new legislation delegating to parties complete control of their membership rules. In connection with this
legislation, the Executive Comnittee of the Democratic Party then promptly passed a
rule limiting its membership to Whites. In Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932),the
Court struck down a Texas statute that empowered parties to choose the qualifications of
primary voters this second round restriction, again on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
Determined to get past the Supreme Court's objections, the Democratic State Convention (a much larger group with far more direct participation than the Executive
Committee) adopted a resolution restricting membership on the basis of race, without an
accompanying statute. This time, the Supreme Court in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S.
45 (1935) approved the convention's restrictions, finding on the basis of the party's "pri-

vate" status that Texas had not taken any state action to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
108.
In Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 (1944), the Court reversed its decision in
Grovey, finding that state law so extensively pervaded the party's participation in elections
that the Convention constituted illegal state action. For an extended discussion of these
historical events, see HINE, supra note 102.
109.
See HINE, supra note 102, at 78, 245-46.
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penses paid via an assessment from candidates who ran in the party priI10
mary.
Much smaller in number, the renegade Woodpeckers represented the
county's less affluent Whites and yeoman farmers, and included a number
of political officials elected with the support of Black voters."' In
shootouts that evoked the violence of the Wild West, the Woodpeckers
and Jaybirds fought bitterly over who would eventually determine the
agenda for the organization. Ultimately, the Jaybirds
claimed victory, and
2
dominated local politics for decades afterward."
Seeking to keep the Woodpeckers (or other upstart splinter groups)
from gaining power via the Black vote, the Jaybirds adopted a privatized
local version of the White primary. The all-White group held a separate
pre-primary election, to determine the party's nominee for the Democratic primary, which took place a few months later." 3 Not surprisingly,
given the Jaybirds' prominence, the Jaybird candidate almost always ran
without opposition and then went on to win in both the Democratic
primaries and the general election." 4 In effect, the Jaybird pre-primary
functioned as the equivalent of the general election, and White candidates
were always elected."'
In 1953, in Terry v. Adams,"1 6 the Supreme Court struck down the
Jaybird all-White primary as unconstitutional, finding that the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibited a state from permitting any organization, public
or private, to replicate the state's election process for the purpose of disfranchising Blacks. But Whites had already effectively excluded Blacks
from the franchise in Fort Bend County for most of the century."'
Some commentators have argued that Whites were motivated by irrational animus to exclude Blacks from the rolls. s But most historians tell
the story of Texas disfranchisement politics as a story of the consolidation
of White political power, a story consistent with the cartel framework." 9
In their view, kicking Blacks off of the rolls wasn't irrational at all. Indeed,
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 245-46.
See id. at 78.
See id. at 78.
See id. at 245-46.
See id. at 246.
See id. at 247 (referring to case law suutary).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
See HINE, supra note 102, at 245-46.
See, e.g., GLENN FELDMAN, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT MYTH: POOR WHITES
AND SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION IN ALABAMA (2004) (arguing that invidious animus by poor
Whites motivated much of the push for disfranchisement).
119.
For an extended discussion of the history of voter disfranchisement for the purpose of consolidating political power, see STEVEN HAHN, THE ROOTS OF SOUTHERN
POPULISM: YEOMAN FARMERS AND THE TRANSFORMATION

1850-1890 (updated ed. 2006);
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legal scholars Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have argued that
White primaries were unconstitutional precisely because they reduced the
competitiveness of political elections.'20 White factions understood that
newly emancipated Blacks would have had the power to control Democratic politics if they had voted as a bloc. Taking matters into their own
hands, racial cartels used the White primary to push Blacks out of the
market and out of political power.
Of course, this White racial cartel operated with significant risk of
defection by either Populists or Conservative Democrats. But the cartel
worked as it did precisely because it functioned as a mutual disarmament
pact. In uniting under the banner of the White primary, the warring
White factions in the Democratic Party agreed that "no matter how acute
the divisions or how acrimonious the debates, neither faction would seek
to prevail through making common cause with Black voters." 2 '
White political parties in Texas benefitted greatly from their monopoly on political power. They controlled the legislature and pushed for
more rent-seeking legislation to cement their political, economic and social control. Economic benefits to White Conservative Democrats
coincided with benefits to populists as well, who enjoyed more economic
prosperity than their Black counterparts during the era ofWhite monopoly. By focusing on these economic benefits, and on the anti-competitive
efforts of political parties to control political parties, we can understand
Jim Crow legislation less as an irrational act motivated by racial animus
and more as an anti-competitive move designed to reap very material
benefits for Whites.
B. The North: Excluding Blacks in Housing Markets
An even better example of racial cartels in action emerges in the
history of residential housing segregation in Chicago: the homeowners'
association. Like Texas political groups, this cartel also united Whites
across social and class differences to restrict access to housing on the basis
of race.
Even before the Civil War, Whites in the great cities of the North
and Midwest had excluded Blacks from housing, labor, education and political markets'22 . Exclusionary sentiment in these regions was already
quite strong. In fact, some scholars have argued that those states that abolished slavery before the Civil War did so in large part because slave labor

120.
Samuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of tile
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
121.
Id. at 663.
122.
See generally DAVID M. DOUGLAS, JIM CROW MOVES NORTH: THE BATTLE OVER
NORTHERN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1865-1954 (2005).
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undercut White wages. 2 3 Having freed the slaves, Whites moved quickly
by excluding them from key areas
to restrict their potential as competitors
2
1
of social, economic and political life.1
Of course, politics among Whites themselves were already pretty
complicated. At the turn of the century, the influx of European immigrants had challenged "native" Whites to absorb the newcomers. Between
1830 and 1860, European immigrants, Irish, German and Scandinavian in
particular, came by the millions to cities like Chicago. Existing immigrant
groups had exhibited hostility to the newcomers."" When Blacks began to
closed ranks against Blacks as
migrate northward, these newest immigrants
26
a way of preserving their fragile gains.
Racial hostility varied with the immigrant group's position in the
pecking order. Those groups who enjoyed a relatively better economic
position and competed less with Blacks in labor markets-e.g., Germans-exhibited less racism against Blacks, at least initially. " Groups like
the Irish who competed more directly with Blacks (and against whom
Blacks were often used as strikebreakers) exhibited more racism, in large
that might come from emancipart because they feared the competition
8
1
South.
the
in
slaves
of
pation
A closer look at Chicago history provides the backdrop against
which to understand the homeowners' association as a form of cartel. In
1860, relatively few Blacks lived in Chicago, and those who did were
evenly spread throughout the city. The Chicago segregation index (which
measures the even spread of Whites and Blacks in a city) was a moderate
50.0."' Inmmigrant Whites had settled throughout the city, in small pockets, and then increasingly throughout the city more evenly.
The end of the Civil War had triggered a second wave of Black immigrants into Chicago. Beginning in earnest in 1860, Blacks began to
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Id.at 166.
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Id. at 166-67.
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Id. at 164-67.
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See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 25, at 21. The segregation index ranges from
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evenness. Id. at 20. According to Stanley Lieberson, in 1890, on the average, Blacks lived
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migrate in the thousands, and then in the hundreds of thousands, to a
newly industrializing city.'30 Pulled from the North by the lure of industrial jobs and pushed from the South by boll weevil infestation and the
drive to modernize farms, Blacks migrated to find a new way of life.
World War I set the stage for open competition between Black and
White workers. Demand for Black labor skyrocketed around the war,
fueled by newly enacted immigrant labor restrictions. Even as the flow of
immigrants was slowing to a trickle, the influx of Blacks accelerated. From
1890 to 1915, the number of Black Chicago residents grew from fifteen
thousand to over fifty thousand, and subsequent waves of Black migration
during and after World War I were double and triple that size. 3'
Northern Whites reacted with alarm to Blacks' entry into White
economic territory. Working-class Whites feared labor competition and
social displacement. 3 2 Immigrant Whites, now becoming homeowners
and business owners, saw Black entry into White housing markets as a
threat to their new status. Accordingly, these groups joined forces to restrict Black entry to certain parts of the city.
By 1900,Whites had cordoned off Black migrants to three main areas, including the narrow finger of land called the Black Belt on the
South Side, and two satellite districts, one on the West Side and the other
in Englewood. 3" By the turn of the century, these primary boundaries for
residential segregation in Chicago had solidified.'34 Thereafter, residential
segregation grew dramatically, in the period between 1910 and 1920, and
by 1940, racial separation achieved an almost perfect segregation index of
.95.' Racial cartels were a big part of this transition.
1. The National Real Estate Board
Two organizations formed the front line of residential exclusion in
Chicago-the city's real estate board and the neighborhood homeowners'
association. The Chicago Real Estate Board, made up of hundreds of individual real estate businesses, operated primarily as a trade organization
130.
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to lobby on behalf of real estate interests locally and nationally.. In 1917,
the Board adopted a formal policy asking brokers to keep Blacks out of
White residential areas. In 1919, the Board unsuccessfully petitioned the
city council to prohibit further Black migration into the city until such7
time as the city could work out lease or sales restrictions against Blacks.'
Shortly thereafter, the Board voted officially to expel any broker who
leased 38or sold property in these new White neighborhoods to Black resi1
dents.
The Board also moved to adopt another, even more potent legal restriction-the restrictive covenant. The restrictive covenant was a private
contract that obligated homeowners (and their heirs) not to sell, lease or
allow occupancy of property by Blacks.1 39 Typically, this agreement was
negotiated between existing neighbors and was a covenant that "runs with
the land," meaning the agreement attached to the property and obligated
all buyers of the property and their successors.
In addition, the Board adopted institutional rules and practices that
were designed to keep Blacks out of White neighborhoods. Early on, the
Board had lobbied for explicit residential segregation by race. When the
Supreme Court ruled racial zoning unconstitutional, the Board then
adopted an Ethics Code provision prohibiting brokers from selling to
buyers who threatened to disrupt the racial composition of the neighborhood. 4 '
In a crucial historical moment that would chart the path for the rest
of the country, the National Association of Real Estate Boards adopted a
version of the Chicago Board's ethics code. 4 ' In response to a nationwide
wave of racial violence, including the Chicago riot of 1919, the national
association (which was located in Chicago) drafted a code provision,
which prohibited realtors from selling to people of color whose presence
would "damage property values." State commissions were authorized by
state law to revoke the state licenses of those brokers who violated this
i •
142
provision.
Beyond the ethics code, the national association also accelerated the
spread of racially restrictive covenants all over the country. In 1927,
NAREB drafted a standardized restrictive covenant to be shared with its
nationwide membership, and the association encouraged members to
136.
137.
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See PHILPOTT, supra note 125, at 185.

138.
See id.
139.
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enlist the help of homeowners' associations
in propagating these covenants
43
region.1
home
members'
the
throughout
Bringing up the rear, the federal government then moved to consolidate and institutionalize the advantage that the local organizations had
generated. Together with the Federal Housing Authority and the Veterans
Administration, the federal Homeowners' Loan Corporation codified redlining as a national practice. Federal programs issued government-backed
low-cost mortgages only to White homebuyers and as a matter of policy,
refused 44such assistance to Black buyers or buyers in Black neighbor1
hoods.
In addition, FHA and VA loan programs financed the selective outmigration of middle-class Whites to the suburbs.1 4 In the late 1940s, the
Fl-A endorsed racially restrictive covenants, and even after the Court
struck covenants down in 1948, the FHA did not change its recommendation until 1950.146
2. The Homeowners' Association
The neighborhood homeowners' association formed the key centerpiece of White efforts to organize residential segregation. Chicago
homeowners and property improvement organizations counted many
White ethnic immigrants who had only recently become first-time
homeowners among their members. Chicago associations typically
claimed between 50 and 2000 members. Not surprisingly, a large proportion of the city's associations located themselves at the southern 1 4edge of
1
the Black Belt and west of the Black community in Morgan Park.
White homeowners' associations deployed many strategies to keep
Blacks out of White Chicago housing. For example, they worked to restrict access to credit for Blacks by pressuring banks and other lenders. Of
course, Blacks had little capital of their own to work with, owing to historic discrimination, and so capital market discriniination worked to
restrict access effectively.
Associations also excluded by putting pressure on Black employment. Along the North Shore they targeted Black domestic workers. For
example, a White homeowners' committee requested neighborhood families unable to house domestic workers on their own premises to fire those
workers.'48
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At the more violent end of the spectrum, associations organized
mobs to fire gunshots into residents' homes, burn crosses on their lawns,
and physically break into their homes to ransack them. 4 9 For example, in
1910, a Chicago homeowners' association mounted a campaign against a
Black woman who had bought property on Lake Street. The group began
their campaign with insults and threats, and soon escalated to violence
when harassment proved ineffective. Under cover of night, a masked
group broke into the house, threatened the woman's family with murder
and tore down the newly built house.5 0
Most notably, like the national association of real estate agents,
homeowners' associations helped to spread the use of restrictive covenants.
Making sure that an area was covered by covenants was time consuming
and expensive. Someone had to track down owners, gather signatures,
compile descriptions of the properties and file signed documents in the
right office. Filers also had to pay drafting and recording fees to put restrictions in deeds. 5' Homeowners' associations came to the rescue,
supplying both labor and money, and perhaps more importantly, organizational energy.The associations and the Chicago Real Estate Board worked
together to launch a campaign to cover the city with restrictive covenants,
and by the end of the 1930s, close
to a third of Chicago properties were
152
covered by restrictive covenants.
In 1948, in a blow to homeowners' associations, the Supreme Court
struck down racially restrictive covenants as unconstitutional. 5 3 Associations immediately moved to come up with alternate covenants. 5 4 To
replace explicit covenants, Chicago associations drafted and litigated
5
agreements to keep "undesirable people" out of the neighborhood.1
They also drafted "conservation agreements," which obligated a homeowner• • to
maintenance" of his property on threat of
156 effect "proper
eviction. Such agreements were selectively enforced, of course, against
undesirable" neighbors.
Of course, agreements are only as good as the monitoring and enforcing behind them, and the homeowners' association played the central
role in policing. Associations structured themselves very much as local
149.
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paramilitary organizations. Groups divided up their turf by neighborhood
lines or blocks, and created association-wide networks to monitor buying
and selling.'"8 In addition, the Board enlisted the associations as spies to
monitor both brokers and owners. The Board often asked associations to
let them know when a resident was planning to sell his home, or when
prospective Black homebuyers approached a homeowner looking to
buy."9 In line with the restrictive covenant, realtors also helped draft informal agreements between realtors, builders, bankers and individual
property owners not to sell or lend to Blacks.'60
Homeowners' associations enforced their agreements using their
members for both monitoring and enforcement, and punishment was
usually swift and fierce. Associations publicized the names of people who
sold across racial lines to encourage community shaming and economic
retaliation. For example, "The Alarm Clock," a community newspaper
sponsored by the Park Manor Improvement Association in Chicago, ran
the following announcements:
Every case on which we can get facts where Whites have sold
to negroes [sic] WILL BE PUBLICIZED. Every White person
that we know who has sold to negroes [sic] will find the truth
of his action no matter where he goes.
And in another section of the paper, the association advertised:
IT HAS BEEN REPORTED: Joseph Biondi of 7020 South
Park sold to colored and has moved to 2007 W6 70"h Street. He
'
is an electrician for the Pennsylvania Railroad.
These two case studies demonstrate the power of collective action
and the profit to be had from racial exclusion. Calling these organizations
cartels serves to uncover aspects of racial exclusion that conventional narratives obscure.
CONCLUSION
In other work, I have explored how the competitive advantage that
racial cartels acquired during earlier periods can become self-reinforcing
See id. at 44-63 (describing structure and size of associations, their coalitions
158.
with other associations within political boundaries, their connection with larger regional
federations).
159.
See id. at 101-02, o.3. One homeowner was approached by a realty company to
ask that he put his house for sale through their company, before he had put his home up.
He suspected that the firm had learned of the potential sale through the Field Secretary of
his regional association. See id. at 84.
See id. at 101.
160.
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over time, even after cartels ceased to operate in race-conscious ways. 162
Network externalities-the way in which a person's wealth or property
value depends on that of her neighbors-operate as institutional feedback
loops that produce persistent inequality, even in the absence of continuing
intentional discrimination.1 3 The argument about cartel conduct lays the
foundation for this feedback-loop argument about self-reinforcing and
persistent inequality.
The racial cartel story also offers an independent contribution to reframing conventional narratives about historical exclusion. First, by
labeling exclusion as cartel conduct, the story emphasizes the unfair competitive advantage that Whites gained by being racist during Jim Crow
and slavery. During these periods, Whites profited from keeping their
non-White competitors out of key markets. Chicago homeowners' associations earned higher property values for their members. Texas working
class farmers and elite planters consolidated their political power and control over the Democratic party. Unions negotiated higher wages for their
White members.
Second, the concept of racial cartels and self-reinforcing advantage
help us understand more precisely the role of history, and how it is that
historical advantage still persists, generation after generation. White families are wealthier because their White ancestors colluded in racial cartels
to acquire ill-gotten gains that have persisted over time. Contemporary
White advantage can be traced to the advantages that racial cartels created
for themselves by way of racial exclusion. The modern-day advantages
that Whites enjoy-greater wealth in their neighborhoods, better access to
political power, better social networks that are connected to more lucrative jobs with plenty of opportunity for advancement-can be traced to
anti-competitive conduct perpetuated by historical cartels.
Finally, the concept of "racial cartels" helps us to frame antidiscrimination law as a form of government "antitrust" intervention, designed to eradicate the persistent effects of historical anti-competitive
conduct. The lawsuits against Microsoft's monopoly in the operating
systems market have been described as an effort to dismantle the selfreinforcing advantage that Microsoft's early behavior created. The argument to dismantle persistent advantage remains even when the original
illegal conduct has stopped (as Microsoft claimed that it had). Likewise, if
racial cartel effects persist over time, even after the dissolution of the cartels, then anti-discrimination law might be targeted to dismantle those
persistent effects.
162.
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It is important to point out that the racial cartel story appears to be
historically specific to African Americans, Mexicans and some Asian
groups. To be sure, other groups like Asians and White ethnic groups
(Irish, Eastern European Jews and other immigrant groups) have faced
similar anticompetitive exclusion at various times in this country's history.
But important historical differences separate the experience of these
groups. Blacks and Mexicans began the competition much further behind
at the outset, because White cartel conduct was so much more severe.
Slavery, for example, meant not only that Blacks could not own property
but were in fact chattel property 64 Land deprivation worked a particular
onus for Mexicans, whose wealth disappeared when the U.S. redrew its
boundaries. More recently, residential segregation has been far more pervasive and long lasting for Blacks and now for Latinos than it ever was for
Jews or other White ethnic groups. 165 Comparatively speaking, Jews and
many Asian groups have not experienced either the magnitude or duration of anti-competitive exclusion experienced by these groups.
An analysis of racial cartels leaves many questions unanswered. For
example, this Article does not take up the larger question of political will
or the smaller and narrower question of remedy. Forthcoming work rehearses a number of suggestions designed to restore market
competitiveness in housing, labor, education and political markets. 6 6 But
it bears noting here that larger, antitrust style reforms may be unlikely.
Collectively, we might now find it too much of a sacrifice-economically,
socially and politically-to do the sort of restructuring that would meaningfully dismantle or restructure persistent advantage that we trace from
racial cartels. Indeed, we may have come too far down the road to switch
164.
Economist James Curtis has compared historical racial differences in wealth
before the end of the Civil War to modern racial differences in wealth. Curtis made two
important findings.
First, he could explain wealth differences among Blacks between 1860 to 1870 by
pointing to their legal status-whether they were free or enslaved. Second, he could trace
modern wealth differences between Blacks and whites to the historical differences, adjusted for growth over time. Not surprisingly, the modern racial gap in wealth likely is
connected to slavery, and to the fact that whites could own property (which included
Black slaves) and Blacks could not. James Curtis, Long-Run Differences in Wealth Among
Blacks and hites: Empirical Results from Structural Regression Decomposition, 2001 Annual
Meeting of the Social Science History Association Meetings, Chicago, Illinois, at 18.
165.
For example, ethnic enclaves proved fleeting, in comparison with the Black
ghetto. Segregation fell significantly for European innigrants after 1910 for a number of
reasons, much of which had to do with a formation of white ethnic identity in reaction to
the increasing in-migration of Blacks. See MASSEY AND DENTON, supra note 25, at 32-33.
See also Deborah C. Malamud, The Jew Taboo: Jewish Difference and the Affirmative Action
Debate 90HIo ST. L.J. 915, 965-69 (1989) (arguing that Eastern European Jewish inmigrants came with a set of labor skills in the garment industry that matched to particular
service needs in the U.S. economy, and that Jews were able to find work in the civil service sector, an area of employment not open to Blacks).
166.
See Roithmayr, Then That Has, Gets, supra note 159.
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back. But if we can't figure out how to radically reconfigure the way that
our institutions distribute advantage and disadvantage, inequality is likely
here to stay.

